FINANCING INFRASTRUCTURE OVER TIME

By David M. Levinson

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the problem of financing infrastructure over time when the number of users also changes. The problem is confronted in many fast-growing communities that need to coordinate the timing of infrastructure and development, yet still achieve economies of scale where they exist. The temporal free-rider problem is defined, whereby the group that finances the construction at a given time is not identical with the group that uses it. The continuous recovery method, which effectively establishes a property rights framework for infrastructure, is described. Continuous recovery enables existing residents to be appropriately compensated by new residents, independent of the number of new residents who ultimately arrive. The system is illustrated and compared with practice in a case that uses a noncontinuous cost recovery system.

INTRODUCTION

Local jurisdictions must balance present and future needs with costs when financing infrastructure. When a fixed piece of infrastructure is funded and built by one group and then a new group comes in and uses it without paying, there is a free-rider problem. When one group comes in and borrows money to build infrastructure and another group is held liable, there is also a free-rider problem. The extent of the problem depends on the site-specific circumstances, nature of financing, and placement of the tax burden. This paper will consider these factors and evaluate suggested solutions.

In the past 2 decades, many localities have levied impact fees to finance new and expanded infrastructure (Bauman and Ethier 1987; Popper 1988; Lee 1989; Nelson 1989; Moore and Muller 1991; Downs 1992; Altshuler and Gomez-Ibañez). The fees are designed to be associated with the “impact” of the development on public services. The impacts include the full gamut of publicly provided services, including roads, sewers, schools, and parks. Although development has generally been held responsible for constructing on-site public services, off-site facilities are often addressed by impact payments. Some communities have adopted value-capture districts to tax adjacent developments for the benefits associated with new transportation infrastructure (Stopher 1993). Others have implemented stringent growth management regulations only weakly tied to financing (Pollakowski and Wachter 1990; Levinson 1998a).

The underlying need for taxes on development arises because of the financing mechanisms used to pay for infrastructure. Suppose a community has adopted “pay-as-you-go” financing and pays outright for a road. When a residential or commercial development comes along, it does not pay the one-time fixed cost of the road, which has already been absorbed by the earlier taxpayers. Failure to recover funds from the development creates a free-rider problem. Foreknowledge of failure to recover those funds may discourage the investment in the first place, leading to underinvestment. Cost
recovery techniques include user charges and impact fees as well as specially designed policies. Alternatively, a different initial financing system, such as bonds (sometimes called “pay as you use”), can be used to help alleviate the problem.

Often a piece of infrastructure can be described by a “U-shaped” cost function. Average fixed costs decline with additional users, but average variable costs rise. At low demand levels, average fixed costs dominate; at higher demand, variable costs are more significant. The appropriate financing mechanism depends on whether costs are falling or rising, and the same system may exhibit different behaviors at different times. When average costs are rising, marginal cost pricing can pay the costs of infrastructure. Unfortunately, in practical terms, it is unlikely that marginal cost pricing (such as road pricing) will soon be widely implemented because of technological difficulties in exclusion and monitoring, as well as political problems in implementation. Further, with rising average costs, existing residents have little incentive to encourage new users of the infrastructure and may insist on significant compensation. When average costs are falling, each additional user has little impact on existing users. Yet those existing users, who paid for the one-time fixed costs, would certainly prefer to be compensated by new residents, who constitute additional users of the infrastructure.

Financing is further complicated because infrastructure is often indivisible; roads, for instance, are built in discrete units. Finally, whether the jurisdiction is open (developers have alternative locations) or closed (developers can locate in the jurisdiction or not develop) greatly influences the outcome of negotiations about what charges are paid.

The analysis in this paper will be similar in some respects to that put forward in Levinson (1998b), which analyzed tolling along a road connecting adjacent jurisdictions. The foremost difference is that, although two groups in time (new and old developments) are similar to two groups in space, the earliest group always moves first, without knowing exactly what the later group will do. Although the first mover acts with uncertainty, the later group knows exactly what the early movers did.

Although this paper focuses on urban and suburban arterial streets to provide concrete examples, financing in time affects many types of facilities. Arterials serve the function of enabling both access and movement, are not easily excludable, and are often maintained by city or county governments. Thus, they are unlike neighborhood collector and distributor streets built by the developer of a subdivision—which only local traffic would use. They also differ from major intercity highways, which are operated by state governments (in the American context) and are often designed as limited-access facilities. Often arterial streets are financed from taxes or developer exactions.

This paper deals with residential development. However, the attribution of transportation infrastructure costs to residential or commercial development is very similar to the argument about taxing income or sales. A trip has two ends; determining which end pays what share of the infrastructure cost of the trip is in many ways arbitrary. It would be a simple extension of the proposed continuous recovery process to allocate a share of infrastructure costs to different sectors (office, retail, industrial, other, and residential), much as is done in the Loveland system described below. The extent of pass through of costs from development to consumers depends on the relative competitiveness of markets. Nicholas et al. (1991) discussed the issue concerning housing costs; other costs should be similar.

In an ideal world, it would be possible to scale infrastructure so that it could be added, as appropriate, by development. There are several practical
difficulties with this approach. The first problem is the indivisibility problem. At best, streets can be built a lane at a time, but a half-lane seldom makes sense. Although at large scales the indivisibility problem becomes relatively minor, in smaller jurisdictions it remains considerable. A second difficulty is the timing of infrastructure deployment; the cost of congestion rises suddenly compared with the decline in the average fixed costs of infrastructure. To be “optimal,” a community must have a great deal of foresight about when a particular level of congestion will occur and have a road ready to be opened at that point. A third issue is the cross-group use of roads; new residents may drive on existing roads and existing residents may use the new roads. However, these uses may not be equal.

An alternative to impact fees while still recovering costs is to, in effect, “rent” the network. This can be accomplished, for instance, by paying for a facility with borrowed funds. Because the community pays annual install- ments, as the size of the community grows with development, the average cost of the infrastructure for both new and existing residents drops. This encourages the right amount of investment. The downside to renting is that the excess cost of renting may exceed the revenue that can be gained by investing the initial capital elsewhere.

Another alternative is to have an explicit recovery policy in place. At least two kinds of recovery policies come to mind. The first allocates in advance the amount a development must pay to the community to recover expenditures of fixed costs. The main difficulty with this approach is its reliance on forecasts, which may or may not materialize. The second, “continuous recovery” policy, dynamically adjusts the charge development must pay but directs that payment to compensate existing residents for earlier payment. Existing residents can be thought of as owning the facility.

This paper proceeds first by outlining a commonly found scenario, where infrastructure with a high fixed cost but low variable cost must be built to support existing and new residents. Pay as you go, bond financing, and impact fees are compared, and then a continuous recovery approach is developed. Although economic theory is geared to using marginal cost pricing, this paper describes the intelligent use of an average cost approach for cases where marginal cost pricing does not recover sufficient revenue. The issue of relative bargaining power between an existing community and a developer is discussed as a limiting factor to this approach. An example is presented comparing the continuous recovery approach with the cost recovery approach found in some communities for financing water and other infrastructure systems.

OLD VERSUS NEW

Consider this situation: A large community has built a section of roadway, paid for by property taxes. A residential development nestled within or ad- jacent to the previously existing community is constructed. The landowners of the development site paid a negligible share of the cost of the roadway, because their land was undeveloped at the time of construction. No new roadways are needed to support the development. How much should the development pay to use the existing infrastructure? To whom should the check be written?

Conventional economic theory says that it is efficient that development pay its marginal cost, even if marginal cost pricing does not recover the fixed cost of building the infrastructure in the first place. If the development only pays its marginal cost and average costs are falling, it is free riding on the
fixed assets constructed by the previously existing community. Existing residents may not find this outcome fair or desirable. Anticipating this outcome, the older community may attempt to do something to prevent it from happening in the first place, by adopting some regulatory mechanism.

This brings out the first issue: what are the expectations involved? Does the existing community have an expectation (such as a law on the books) of being reimbursed when it decides to expand a capital facility, or does it lack that expectation until after the facility is constructed? That expectation depends on whether a policy has been adopted and, as importantly, when that policy was adopted. If the policy was adopted prior to the construction of the existing infrastructure, there is an expectation of recovery (point A in the first row of Fig. 1). However, if the policy came after the existing infrastructure was built, but before any new development, then recovery is an added bonus to the existing landowners, who still may be able to exact it from new development (point B). Whereas, if the policy arrives after the development, it has no effect (point C).

However, if development leads a decision to build infrastructure, then it is likely that both the preexisting community and the development will be assessed at point D or point E, as shown in the second row of Fig. 1. This is because separating out the groups after a development is approved and constructed is difficult (the U.S. Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws). This case, similar to point C above, places a greater burden on the community than would have been required prior to the approval of the development.

**PAY-GO, BONDS, AND IMPACT FEES**

Three basic financing schemes can be considered, with numerous variations. The first is pay as you go (pay-go), which requires that a facility be paid for when constructed. In the absence of a recovery procedure, the payment falls on the residents at the time of construction. The second is some sort of bond financing, wherein the payments are spread over time and fall on those in residence at the time of the payment. Bond financing adds an interest charge for the cost of capital. The total costs of bond financing may exceed the total costs of pay-as-you-go financing, depending on a comparison of market interest rates and the return to opportunities available for spending capital. A third financing mechanism is an impact fee, which would be a lump sum charge imposed for new infrastructure on new development.

These financing schemes for two classes of infrastructure have incidence on the two classes of users, as shown in Table 1. In the pay-go system, all new infrastructure will have to be paid for by everyone, not just the development. A growing community where new residents are expected to be numerous compared with earlier residents will prefer refinancing old infrastructure with bonds, but for new infrastructure the computation is more complicated. An assessment must be made about future development as well. If the development is the last one a community will see, pay as you go might

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**FIG. 1.** Timeline of Recovery Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructure leads development</th>
<th>Community -&gt;</th>
<th>[A] -&gt;</th>
<th>Infrastructure -&gt;</th>
<th>[B] -&gt;</th>
<th>Development -&gt;</th>
<th>[C]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development leads infrastructure</td>
<td>Community -&gt;</td>
<td>[A] -&gt;</td>
<td>Development -&gt;</td>
<td>[D] -&gt;</td>
<td>Infrastructure -&gt;</td>
<td>[E]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 1. Cost Incidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old infrastructure</th>
<th>Pay-go</th>
<th>Bond</th>
<th>Impact fee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$T/Q + t/(Q + q)$, $t/(Q + q)$</td>
<td>$T/Q + r/(Q + q)$, $r/(Q + q)$</td>
<td>$T/Q$, $t/q$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond</td>
<td>$(R + t)/(Q + q)$, $(R + t)/(Q + q)$</td>
<td>$(R + r)/(Q + q)$, $(R + r)/(Q + q)$</td>
<td>$R/(Q + q)$, $R/(Q + q) + t/q$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: [existing residents payment, new development payment]; for simplicity, assume that new development follows immediately after infrastructure (re)financing, so bond payments for old infrastructure are borne proportionally by old residents and new development. $R$ and $r =$ net present value of future bond payment for old and new infrastructures, respectively.

be preferred to bonds (to reduce future interest costs). However, if the development is simply one in a long string of oncoming development, bonds have advantages over pay-go. With bonds, the base over which payments are made will continue to be expanded (and the per capita payment will decline over time).

This situation can be formulated as a game, with the objective for players (community and developer) to minimize their own costs given a certain infrastructure deployment. This is a one-time game; although the decisions may recur, they do so with different player sets. If existing residents choose the financing means for old infrastructure and the developer chooses it for new infrastructure, then (re)financing both old and new infrastructure with bonds is generally a stable equilibrium. A different solution may result if there is little future growth or the costs of bonds are large relative to pay-go. However, if the residents set the rules under which infrastructure is financed, then old infrastructure would be paid for with bonds and new infrastructure would be paid for by an impact fee on development. (And if developers set the rules, then old infrastructure would be pay-go and new infrastructure would be pay-go or bond).

So, intertemporal equity in terms of allocating costs to those who cause them, efficiency in terms of internalizing costs of infrastructure to those who benefit from it, and stability all argue for bond financing over pay as you go for financing capital facilities. The primary downside is the additional costs associated with interest payments.

CONTINUOUS RECOVERY

It should be possible to develop a mechanism for achieving the benefits of intertemporal equity and efficiency without the costs associated with borrowing on the open market. This is continuous recovery, which effectively makes the existing residents the owners of a “capital facility club,” which new residents can join by paying their share of the cost to the earlier members (this is detailed in the Appendix).

As shown in Fig. 2, development $q$ pays the average cost of infrastructure $c$ to existing residents $Q$, compensating them for their “excess” payment. In this case, development pays what it should in terms of “second best” pricing; it just pays it to the existing residents. If this does not happen, old residents are paying more than they should (their excess payment) because the recovery of costs was anticipated, and thus internalized, in property values. The relationships are expressed below.
\[ (Q + q) \cdot c = Q \cdot C \]  
\[ C = \frac{T}{Q} \]  
\[ c = \frac{T}{Q + q} \]

where \( T \) = total fixed cost; \( C \) and \( c \) = average fixed cost of infrastructure before and after development, respectively; and \( Q \) and \( q \) = existing and new populations, respectively.

However, the actual (out-of-pocket) cost of allowing \( q \) to develop given \( Q \) is zero if average costs are falling, so anything \( q \) contributes bail out \( Q \). This situation applies to the case where the recovery policy is imposed after the existing residents pay for the capital facility but before the development is constructed (as opposed to before both old and new development). The property right to recover the money invested in the capital facility is not as strong in this case as when recovery was assumed before the initial decision to construct the infrastructure. One might suggest that there is a welfare loss with recovery.

In this case, the welfare loss (demand not realized because it is priced) is denoted by the shaded triangle in Fig. 2. Here, no individual would be harmed in the short run by permitting extra development (as we only have fixed costs). This welfare may not change the motivation of the original residents, as the loss accrues not to them but to some other set of individuals (potential new residents). If the capital facility was already paid with no expectation of recovery and has no marginal costs to use, should additional users be able to free ride? How does free riding harm anyone? Charging for use without an expectation of recovery is “unfair,” the same as being unable to recover costs when there was an expectation that one could. However, “unfairness” may lead to inefficiencies. These inefficiencies include underinvestment or lagging investment over the long term. Residents may choose not to build in advance if unfairness is perceived. Furthermore, this kind of “cheating,” exploiting a resource without compensation, will eventually lead to a loss of confidence in the system.

**FIG. 2.** Illustration of Welfare Loss
BARGAINING

Although the right to permit development may always reside with existing residents, the actual ability of residents to impose costs on development depends on the respective bargaining strengths of the community and developers. Perhaps the most important indicator of bargaining strength is the degree of monopoly power the residents of the existing jurisdiction have. That depends on the choices available to a developer and the potential new residents the developer represents.

In a “closed city,” the entire analysis area is contained within one governmental unit, so the existing residents have very strong bargaining power. New residents (developers) can either pay what existing residents ask or not locate there. A closed city may be an isolated community or a strong regional government (with growth controls) giving a spatial monopoly to existing residents at the expense of potential residents.

In an “open city,” new residents or developers can play jurisdictions off each other; if one charges too much, another may undercut it. In an open city, relative bargaining strength resides with developers, who can drive development exactions down. Because something is better than nothing in terms of recovering fixed costs (when there are declining average costs), the existing community may accept less than its full fair-share cost recovery from a new development.

In addition to the open-city/closed-city distinction, other factors may play into bargaining above recovery. These include other positive and negative externalities of development, in particular tax-based changes, demands on public services, accessibility benefits, and congestion costs. If the existing residents receive a positive net benefit from the development, the amount they constrict the development should be less than if there is a negative net benefit X. Similarly, if the development achieves economic profits P, then the existing community may try to exact some share of those profits in exchange for permission to develop. The resulting charge will range between a subsidy to development up to the amount of a positive net externality and to a charge of up to the economic profits of the development. More precise values than this depend on market conditions and the number of competing jurisdictions and developers.

Table 2 is the payoff matrix to user classes (community and developer) under two conditions of recovery from the community and two responses from a developer. Simply put, if X < payment < P, then development will occur with payment. If the externality is positive, then the payment may be negative. The precise amount is indeterminate from this analysis.

The application of continuous recovery in a community surrounded by nonadapting jurisdictions is limited by its bargaining power. In the short term, it may not be possible to recover 100% of fixed costs if neighboring jurisdictions are providing irrational development subsidies. In the long run, however, a sound financing system and strong public services should be an at-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Developer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do not pay</td>
<td>Pay if required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No payment required</td>
<td>[0 − P, P]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment required</td>
<td>[0, 0]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: X = net negative externality, P = economic profit to new development.

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tractive amenity to new residents and commercial development. Soundly financed services should shift demand, which will increase the community’s relative bargaining power, offsetting partially or entirely the short-term problem of neighboring communities subsidizing development.

EXAMPLES

There are a number of cities with capital recovery (or recoupment) fees for water and sewer—among them (discovered by the author through an Internet search) are Austin, Houston, and Round Rock, Tex.; Chelmsford, Mass.; Chesterfield County, Va.; Concord, N.C.; Conway, S.C.; Dunedin, Fla., Gurnee, Ill.; Loveland, Colo., Montecito, San Jose, and Santa Clara, Calif.; Pooler, Ga.; and Calgary, Canada. There is also a software package at (http://www.ratemod.com/) that automates the process of calculating the rates (Ratemod 2000). Capital recovery is also becoming a significant issue in electricity deregulation, particularly concerning who will pay for existing expensive generation plants (so-called “stranded” costs). However, the use of capital recovery charges does not seem prevalent in other infrastructure categories.

Loveland, Colo. is perhaps the most widely recognized example of a capital cost recovery impact fee (Heath et al. 1989; Nicholas et al. 1991). Impact fees comprise 5.8% of the city budget, user fees are 9.1%, and utilities are 46.3% (“Finance” 2000). Unlike conventional impact fees, which are used to expand facilities, the recovery fee allows development to buy into existing excess capacity provided by the community. A sample calculation for a library facility in Loveland using their approach and a comparison with the proposed continuous recovery approach are given in Tables 3 and 4.

### TABLE 3. Loveland Capital Expansion Fee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Loveland (dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Total capital cost $T$</td>
<td>3,354,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Replacement and betterment cost $B = T \cdot Q/(Q + q)$</td>
<td>1,571,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Future capacity in units $q$</td>
<td>14,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Capital expansion fee $= (T - B)/q$</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Adapted from Table 13-2 in Nicholas et al. (1991) and author’s calculations; $Q$ and $q$ = existing and new populations, respectively (32,700 and 37,100) in persons (at 2.53 people per household, ~12,900 and ~14,700 households, respectively).

### TABLE 4. Continuous Recovery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value (dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Total capital cost $T$</td>
<td>3,354,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Initial cost per household $= T/Q$</td>
<td>260.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Fee for first new household $= T/(Q + 1)$</td>
<td>259.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Fee for 5,000th new household $= T/(Q + 5,000)$</td>
<td>187.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Fee for last new household $= T/(Q + q)$</td>
<td>121.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Total amount paid (before returns)</td>
<td>2,550,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Total amount returned to $q$</td>
<td>764,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Total amount returned to $Q$ = net total amount paid by $q$</td>
<td>1,786,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Amount recovered by $Q$ per household $= [line H/Q]$</td>
<td>138.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Net payment by $Q$ $= (T/Q) - [line I]$</td>
<td>121.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 illustrates the Loveland policy as applied to a library, ignoring corrections for excess capacity, external funding, or splits between residential and commercial development. The total capital cost of the facility is allocated proportionately to existing and future households. The capital expansion fee is simply the share allocated to future households divided by the number of those households. The continuous recovery policy (Table 4), on the other hand, does not have a single fee. Rather, the fee depends on the number of units that have actually been developed. So, for instance, if only 5,000 additional housing units are constructed (rather than the 14,700 forecast), the cost per unit for those 5,000 will be higher ($187 versus $121). As additional units are constructed, the earlier units are given rebates. Small differences in numbers between Tables 3 and 4 are due to rounding error in the original Loveland example.

There are several differences between the Loveland and other real-world examples and the proposed continuous recovery system. The first difference concerns whether individuals or the community is repaid by the system. Existing capital cost recovery approaches fail to return the funds directly to the residents who paid for it. That is, they are, or are analogous to, a debt financing system for bonds rather than a community-owned capital facility club. Second, the choice of the basis over which to estimate the fees is critical. Either a historical basis (the cost to actually build the facility for which excess capacity is being sold) or the cost to replace the facility (minus depreciation) in current dollars could be used. Loveland assesses based on replacement cost. However, the use of a replacement basis, although certainly appropriate for new or future construction, may result in a profit to existing residents or the community as a whole when the capacity has already been built. Third, the Loveland program keeps the fee fixed, a true continuous recovery program as outlined in the paper would vary the fee over time based on the number of actual users. Loveland’s program requires forecasting the ultimate number of users and then allocates costs accordingly. Should the forecast be optimistic and not all the new residents materialize, then the original residents of Loveland will have overpaid (if Loveland does not use bond financing).

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

When infrastructure needs to be financed with taxes rather than user fees, the issue of which class of citizens pays for the infrastructure is still not resolved. A properly designed financing system is still required to have an equitable distribution of the burden while producing efficient infrastructure. The financing system must operate within the confines of an institutional structure that attributes the ownership of the infrastructure to those who paid for it and does not allow use without buy-in.

The continuous cost recovery system suggested here is an improvement upon top-down financing allocation systems that rely on the realization of forecasts to achieve an equitable burden. If the forecasted levels of development are not reached, the existing residents are stuck holding a larger payment than are those who moved after the charge was imposed. If property rights to infrastructure use are placed in the hands of existing residents, then a mechanism for recovering fixed costs is a necessary feature of a politically viable infrastructure financing system.

The argument was made that an intertemporal equity policy is necessary to encourage an efficient level of infrastructure investment. There are several mechanisms to achieve intertemporal equity, including bond financing or an
explicit policy of recovery with pay as you go financing. These procedures do not supplant impact fees to pay for congestion or facility expansion. Rather, they supplement the marginal cost approach to recover fixed costs when marginal costs are zero or falling.

The actual outcomes in terms of the selected financing mechanism and the amount paid rests critically on the institutional assumptions of a “right” of access to infrastructure for a new development or a “right” to prevent access by the existing community. It further rests on the relative bargaining power, determined by the alternatives available to a developer or potential new residents in terms of sites to build or locate in neighboring communities. Many of the actual results are indeterminate within a core range of values. In a city where developers have relatively strong bargaining power, charging more than the market will bear will eliminate the possibility of any recovery.

**APPENDIX. INFRASTRUCTURE CLUB**

As a practical implementation of continuous recovery, we can think of forming an infrastructure club. To begin, assume that infrastructure is collectively indivisible, so no weighting of the cost-share infrastructure by use would be made. All existing households would be grandfathered into the club, but all new households would be required to pay a membership fee to the existing members. The fee would be proportionate to

\[ I_q = \frac{T}{Q + q} \]  

(4)

where \( I_q \) = fee new households must pay to buy into infrastructure club; \( Q \) = population of existing households (excluding new households); \( q \) total number of new households; and \( T \) total fixed cost of existing infrastructure attributed to households.

The fee \( I_q \) would be rebated to existing households periodically (as a tax refund for instance). A similar model could be applied to commercial development. Thus at the end of a time period, each existing household would be paid \( J_Q \)

\[ J_Q = \frac{\sum_{q=1}^{Q} I_q}{Q} = \sum_{q=1}^{Q} \frac{T}{Q + q} \]  

(5)

However, new development might also bring with it additional infrastructure. This “payment in kind” would need to be credited. We can, as above, calculate a fee that each existing household would have to pay to each new household to compensate it for bringing new infrastructure to the table

\[ I_O = \frac{t}{Q + q} \]  

(6)

where \( I_O \) = fee existing households must pay to compensate new development for providing infrastructure to add to the infrastructure club; and \( t \) = total fixed cost of new infrastructure attributed to residential development.

Thus as the end of a time period, each new household would be paid \( J_q \)

\[ J_q = \frac{\sum_{q=1}^{Q} I_q}{q} = \sum_{q=1}^{Q} \frac{t}{Q + q} \]  

(7)
Thus the net payment $K_q$ for each new household would be

$$K_q = I_q - J_q = \frac{T}{Q + q} - \sum_{q=1}^{Q} \frac{t}{q}$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

And the net compensation $K_Q$ for each existing household would be

$$K_Q = J_Q - I_Q = \frac{T}{Q + q} - \frac{t}{Q + q}$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

Although this fee is paid all at once to existing households, new households might see it added to their mortgage. Clearly this is a simplified model; extensions would include spatial differentiation to account for different usage of different facilities by different areas. In each period, the existing population $Q$ would grow by the number of new households $q$.

REFERENCES


NOTATION

The following symbols are used in this paper:

$B =$ replacement and betterment cost;

$C =$ average fixed cost of infrastructure before development;
\[ c = \text{average fixed cost of infrastructure after development}; \]
\[ I_O = \text{fee existing households must pay to compensate new development}; \]
\[ I_q = \text{fee new households must pay to buy into infrastructure club}; \]
\[ J_O = \text{payment each existing household receives}; \]
\[ J_q = \text{payment each new household receives}; \]
\[ K_O = \text{net compensation for each existing household}; \]
\[ K_q = \text{net payment for each new household}; \]
\[ P = \text{economic profit to new development}; \]
\[ Q = \text{existing population}; \]
\[ q = \text{new population}; \]
\[ R = \text{net present value of future bond payment for old infrastructure}; \]
\[ r = \text{net present value of future bond payment for new infrastructure}; \]
\[ T = \text{total fixed cost of existing infrastructure}; \]
\[ t = \text{total fixed cost of additional infrastructure}; \]
\[ X = \text{net negative externality}. \]